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Strategic Insight 
Economic Stress and Instability in the Arab World 
by guest analyst Paul Sullivan. Dr. Sullivan has been a professor of economics at the National Defense 
University since July 1999. For six years previous, he taught and researched at the American University 
in Cairo. He has published articles on the political economy and economic diplomacy of Egypt, Jordan 
and Syria; the political economy of Iraq; the economic effects of the Gulf War of 1991; the economics of 
oil in the Middle East and North Africa; the economics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the political 
economies of Mauritania, Algeria and Tunisia; US-Iranian relations, and other issues. Dr. Sullivan had a 
column, "Cairo to Calcutta," in The Middle East Times. He received his B.A. from Brandeis University 
(Summa Cum Laude) and his M.A., M.Phil. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from Yale University. 
Strategic Insights are authored monthly by analysts with the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC). The 
CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the NDU, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
May 2, 2003 
Although many of the generating forces behind the instability, violence, and anger within the Arab world[1] 
may not be economic in nature[2], general and particular economic stagnancy and instability over the last 
couple of decades has not helped to cool the ferment of the region. If anything, declining real incomes, 
declining real wages, inequalities of income, wealth and opportunities, underemployment and 
unemployment, poverty, housing stress, slow diversification of the economies, continuing low levels of 
industrialization, high levels of actual illiteracy and the crises of quality in education, economic corruption 
and repression, demographic stresses, and more have magnified festering political and social problems.  
The average per capita income in the Arab world is about $2100-2300.[3] There are about 240 million 
persons in the region. Total GDP might be on the order of $504-552 billion, which is roughly 1.8 to 2 times 
the gross state product of Massachusetts. Even the countries that Americans presume to be wealthy are 
really not as strong economically as one would think. The per capita GDP of Saudi Arabia is about 
$10,000. That is below the poverty line in the United States for a family of four. The country with the 
highest per capita income is the UAE with about $19,000 per year. This is not exactly an impressive sum 
to the ears of an American. So if there is so much oil wealth, why is the per capita income so small? Too 
many people have too little, and too few have much may be part of the answer for some Arab countries. 
There is poverty in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). There is also massive wealth. Also, for those 
who like to point to the GCC countries as bastions of wealth, one should remember that 90% of the Arab 
population resides outside of the GCC. There is inequality within these countries, and most certainly 
across these countries—and more than just in income.  
In a country like Egypt, the income inequality numbers look fairly good until you really think about them. A 
huge majority of the people in Egypt are scraping by in grinding economic circumstances. When one 
takes away the income of the wealthy (1-2% of the population) and the middle class (maybe 3-4% of the 
population), one could conclude that the average income of Egyptians is under $1000 per year—even if 
the data shows the average GDP per capita to be about $1300. Middle class in many Arab countries 
means making between $600 and $2000 per year. Middle class income in a country like Yemen, a 
country with about $350 per capita GDP, would be the equivalent of a monthly car payment in the United 
States. Algeria may be one of the most unequal countries in the region, as would be Mauritania. Both are 
fairly poor by western standards. Algeria has a per capita income of about $2300. Mauritania's is about 
$400-450. Small wealthy cliques pretty much run the economies of these two countries.  
Anyone who has visited the region long enough can see the stark wealth and income differences, and the 
anger and hopelessness of some of the unemployed, the poor within such wealth. (Most of the poor in the 
Arab world are working poor.)  
Possibly as much as $600-800 billion in Arab money is invested outside of the region, mostly in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a lot in the United States. Imagine 
how much better off the Arabs would be if this money came back? This $600-800 billion is greater than 
the GDP of the Arab world. The inequality data seem to not include this outside wealth, or the income 
generated from it. Most of these monies came out of the GCC, but there could be as much as $40-60 
billion out of Egypt.  
Foreign investment in the Arab world, outside of oil and gas, is miniscule in comparison to such 
investments that have been pouring into Asia. Per capita foreign direct investment is the lowest for any 
region in the world outside of sub-Saharan Africa. Only about 3% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
goes to the Arab world. The Arab world's percentage of overall world trade has declined by almost 35% 
since 1980 to just 3%. Most of this is oil and gas.  
Manufacturing exports, a source of employment generation and income stabilization, are miniscule 
compared to exports of oil and gas. Total manufacturing exports of the region are far less than they could 
be. Manufacturing exports from Israel, population 6 million, are about $24 billion per year. Manufacturing 
exports from Turkey, population about 67 million, are about $25 billion. Total Arab world (population 240 
million) manufacturing exports are about $19 billion. Some countries, like Tunisia and Egypt have made 
strides recently, particularly Tunisia, in manufacturing exports. But they have not come far enough. Trade 
reforms have made some progress, but more slowly than elsewhere. Structural reforms have gone slower 
than expected or hoped for by many.  
On the other hand, there have been great relative successes, especially in countries like Oman, Syria, 
and Tunisia, in improvements in human development indicators like life expectancy, maternal mortality, 
child mortality, access to sanitation and health care, daily supplies of various nutrients, and others over 
the last three decades. However, within the human development index list of the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) only four Arab countries land in the high human development category: 
Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar. Israel is way ahead on the scale compared to any Arab state.  
Most of the Arab states have a negative number for the difference between per capital income rank and 
the Human Development Index (HDI) rank. In other words, their income rankings are much higher than 
their human development scores. Those with the largest differences in those scores are Saudi Arabia, 
Oman, Algeria, Djibouti, and Qatar. There seems to be a disconnection between wealth and human 
development. On economic and political freedom scores the Arab world also does not fare well. One 
wonders whether this could be part of the explanation for the disconnection between GDP and human 
development.  
For most of the Arab countries their real per capita incomes have either stagnated or declined compared 
to the 1980s. Real wages in many of the countries have declined over the last two decades. Productivity 
per worker has on average declined in most Arab states since the 1980s. Real wages have declined often 
because of the pressures on them due to increasing unemployment.  
Unemployment has increased in many of the Arab countries in recent years. It continues to increase. The 
labor force growth rates will far outrun the growths in employment in many of these countries for the near 
future at least. Unemployment for the entire group of countries is about 15%. Combined unemployment 
and underemployment could be as high as 20-25%. In some countries the unemployment rates are truly 
stunning: Algeria, 30%; Iraq, before the war, was possibly 50%, after the war and until recently it could be 
in the 80-90% range; the West Bank and Gaza could be as high as 35-50% and in some areas as much 
as 75%. First time job seekers have the worst of it. About 80% of the unemployed in Egypt are first time 
job seekers. Real wages have declined in almost all occupations in Egypt since 1980.  
Even in countries like Saudi Arabia, where millions of workers have been imported, there are increasing 
unemployment and underemployment rates amongst Saudis. There is, most importantly, an increasing 
unemployment rate amongst the educated and college graduates.  
Even though the population growth rates have declined in many of these countries, the labor force growth 
rates remain high, often in the 2.3-3% per year levels. These labor force growth rates are expected to 
continue for the next decade as the 0-14 year olds, in many of these countries about 30-40% of their 
populations, start seriously looking for long-term employment. What they may find is long-term 
unemployment, underemployment and frustration, unless some serious changes are made. This rising 
tide of job seekers could be a source of significant instability and violence in the future.  
Egypt, for example, has about 1.2 million new Egyptians each year. It needs to produce about 750,000 
jobs per year. It is only producing about 350,000 per year.  
Throughout the Arab world, many graduates from universities find it extremely difficult to find jobs that fit 
their education and training. There is much frustration amongst many graduates in Egypt, for example, 
where it is not difficult to find MA engineering graduates driving taxis, and graduates in business having 
their first job, if they are lucky, as bank tellers.  
A lot of potential unemployment and underemployment has been absorbed by the informal sectors of 
many Arabs states. One wonders how much more it can absorb without pushing real earnings down even 
further. Unless there are significant changes in the way things are being done in places like Egypt, Algeria, 
Jordan, Morocco and Yemen, we may be looking at an economic catastrophe sometime within the next 
15 or so years. The fact that some of the Arab states have a "capital bias" built into their policies of 
structural reform and development hurts employment prospects even more so. 
Clearly, most of the generation of employment for the next few decades will have to be from the Arab 
countries themselves. Otherwise, they will be dealing with an extremely explosive situation. Even in the 
GCC, where population growth rates have been staying high, like in Saudi Arabia with its population 
growth rate of about 3% per year (one of the highest in the region), where will these people work? The 
highest population growth rate is in the Occupied Territories. The employment problems they will face 
over the next couple of decades could be terrifying. There is hope that new industries might also be 
started, such as in auto parts and other intermediate goods, to supply factories in the EU, for example. 
There is also hope in the demographic transition in the EU. The EU will need workers as its population 
ages in the next decades. Arabs could fill in the gap. But there will likely be competition from other groups 
as well. There is also a growing anti-immigrant sentiment in the EU. The GCC states will hardly be a 
source for employment like they were in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
About 50% of all persons in the Arab world are illiterate. Women and girls fare the worst. They also are 
often the first to leave school and the least likely to gain any significant education. One wonders how the 
children learn when the mothers are illiterate or poorly educated. To be fair, there have been some great 
improvements in literacy rates over the last couple of decades. However, when one considers how real 
incomes have been in decline for most people in the Arab world for the last couple of decades, it seems 
that the region is an outlier in showing that the return to increased years of education is negative, or, at 
best, a wash. Also, when one considers that often literacy in the region is defined as attending four years 
of elementary school, or being able to write one's name, then one wonders what we are really talking 
about.  
There is a huge problem with the quality of education in the region. There may be more students, and a 
greater percentage of persons in each age group attending school, but many in the region question what 
they are learning, how they are learning, and what sort of labor force and what kind of citizens are being 
produced from these schools.  
There is a wide range of variability of quality and quantity of education in the Arab world. One can 
conclude, however, that many of the education systems are in need of serious overhaul.  
Many point to the fact that the Arab world puts a competitively large proportion of their GDPs toward 
education. But their GDPs are small. Expenditures per student are far below those to be found in the EU, 
the United States or places like Singapore. Public expenditure on education in real terms in the Arab 
world has declined since 1980. It is the only region where this has happened.  
R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP are the lowest outside of sub-Saharan Africa. International 
patenting, and scientific and engineering publications are well behind most regions in per capita terms. 
There are many persons working in R&D, science and engineering, but there is something stopping them 
from reaching their massive potential. Some of the best and brightest of the Arab world have also fled to 
"greener pastures" via the "brain drain". The Arabs are also not cooperating much in science, technology 
and R&D. Here is yet another loss for their people. Repressive states and elites can also contribute to a 
low level of production of new ideas and inventions. 
Housing is another issue of concern. There are significant deficits in housing in many of the Arab states. 
Algeria, Morocco and Egypt may have some of the most severe deficits. Iraq and the Occupied Territories, 
after the recent attacks and demolitions, may be in the worst shape. Many people in the region live in 
hovels or squatter settlements. Many do not have their properties registered, and hence cannot use them 
for collateral for credit—a driving force of the OECD. There is no viable mortgage market in many of these 
states. Often the way to purchase a house is to put 40-50% of the price of the house as a down payment, 
and pay the rest within the year. Mortgage markets are developing in some of the countries, but not fast 
enough to keep up with the demand for housing.  
If one were to take an optimistic track, within these housing shortages could be a possibly great 
opportunity to reduce unemployment in the region. If the mortgage markets, housing and construction 
markets are freed up (for most of these countries these are run by the State monopolies of private 
oligopolies), and the tariffs on imported construction supplies are dropped, and the employment markets 
in construction are made more efficient, then this could be a great industry to absorb some of the new 
workers. They need houses. They build the houses. Supply and demand works.  
Poverty seems to be on the increase in the region. Many studies point to increases in poverty in Morocco, 
Jordan, Yemen, Egypt and Algeria over the past decade. These are potentially brittle countries, and 
potentially pivotal countries for extremism and violence. Again, it is important to look at definitions. 
Extreme poverty in the region is often defined as living on $1 or less a day. Just plain poverty is defined 
as living on $2 or less a day. Now that may seem extreme for an American, but for many Arabs that is the 
way life is. About 100 million Arabs are significantly impoverished. About 14% of Arabs live under $1 a 
day according to some sources. Some observers suggest it could be as much as 20+%. Possibly about 
22-30% of the Arab world lives on less than $2 a day. $1 a day works out to $365 per year, or about the 
GDP per capita of Yemen. $2 a day works out to $730 per year, which is probably not far from the per 
capita income of the Gaza strip during a good year, or the income of an average unskilled to semi-skilled 
working person in the urban areas of Egypt and Algeria. 
About 50% of the poor are in rural areas. About 42% of Arabs live in rural areas. Most of the illiterates 
and otherwise poorly educated are found in the rural areas. Most development and anti-poverty schemes 
in the region focus on the urban areas. Some of the countries, like Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Yemen, 
have found extremist elements developed in these relatively neglected rural areas. Chronic, and 
sometimes worsening, rural poverty has also contributed to the rapid urbanization of many Arab states, 
and the many stresses and strains that go along with rapid urbanization in relatively poor countries, with 
fairly low levels of urban employment production. The rural poor often just become the urban poor—with 
dashed hopes. Some think that this rapid urbanization and the continuing poverty and hopelessness of 
the new arrivals in the cities has led to some rather easier recruiting for the extremists in some places.  
Two decades of poor growth in the Arab world have added to the miseries of the poor. Economic growth 
is the best way to beat poverty in the long run. It had been possible for a while to alleviate some of the 
potential poverty with remittance incomes. Aid flows have also declined to the Arab countries over the last 
few years.  
The oil booms, the peace process, the modernization programs, Arab socialism, attempts at economic 
liberalization, urbanization, attempts at industrialization, often feeble attempts at democratization, and 
more were all sources of hope for the people of the Arab world. In most cases these hopes have been 
dashed and shattered. For some of the youth in the region the peaceful ways do not seem to work. This is 
a region that has had its share of violence. If only the youth knew how much this violence, and the trillions 
that went into military expenditures for these wars and conflicts—and for other reasons—has costs the 
Arabs. Past violence has sapped the Arabs of trillions of dollars of potential income and wealth.  
So what might the future hold? That is really up to the Arabs, their governments, and those who care 
about the region. There will be a large increase in the number of people seeking jobs in a mostly stagnant 
economic region. Millions more will need housing. Millions more will need schooling, and quality schooling. 
There will likely be increasing water and land stress. If the political and economic crises in the region 
continue to fester, and continuing economic stagnation remains a magnifier of these issues, then more, 
and, possibly more serious, trouble is to come. The multiple failures of the region open up a vacuum for 
the extremists. The Arabs, a great people, deserve better than what they have gotten so far—and far 
better than the cold and dangerous, and most likely economically more destitute, world that the extremists 
are offering up.  
A key point to remember when considering the tough policy choices ahead is: prosperous and free people 
have no use for extremists.  
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References 
1. The Arab world is defined here as the Middle East and North Africa minus Turkey and Iran.  
2. There are certainly enough factors: the situation in Iraq, the plight of the Palestinians, the relative 
economic failure of the Arabs compared to Israel, domestic repression, a sometimes constant sense of 
Arab powerlessness and humiliation on the world stage in many arenas, perceived and actual injustices 
domestically and internationally, and more. This is a place of ferment. 
3. Data on some issues in the Arab world are difficult to find, and when some of the data are found, the 
quality of the data sometimes remains an open question. Also, many of the Arab governments thrive on 
secrecy and trying to hide from the world the truths about their countries. The data in this paper should be 
considered as indicative only. More household survey and much better data collection needs to be done 
before the picture of the region becomes clearer. The IMF and others are working with some of the Arab 
countries on this, but that may take some time 
 
